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This paper aims to provide a holistic approach of combining multiple research areas to 
forecast IPO performance over a timespan ranging from one day after the IPO date until 
the ninetieth trading day. I find that the length of the cooling-down period and that the 
IPOs raw return after the first day of trading are somewhat capable of forecasting returns. 
I conclude that several researches are successful in explaining relationships between 
performance and certain variables but that the relationship is not sufficiently robust in 
order to actually forecast returns.  I also find evidence that corporate managers suffer from 
concave utility functions under bullish market circumstances and convex functions under 
bearish circumstances. Furthermore, my findings confirm that corporate managers base 
their IPO decision on the average market return 90 days prior to the announcement or 
approval date.  




Initial public offerings (IPOs) seem to be the golden apples that make you rich. However, it 
has proven to be very hard to get in on the IPO action as a small investor. As brokers are 
looking to sell large amounts of stocks to institutional investors and favor their best 
customers, it is virtually impossible to get a piece of the IPO pie. Therefore, this research 
attempts to create a strategy for small-time investors to benefit from IPOs.  
Since small-time investors are rarely able to buy the IPO shares at a discount, I research 
which variables possibly determine the returns over a holding period of 89 days which starts 
one day after the stock’s initial listing on the exchange. The rationale for the 89 day holding 
period can be explained by Rule 144 of the Securities Exchange Commission (SEC). In a 
nutshell, by issuing Rule 144, the SEC has restricted the trade of securities owned by any 
person who directly or indirectly controls the issuer for the first ninety days after the stock’s 
initial offer date. Even though the SEC does not require firms to have a minimum lock-up 
period, the inability of these individuals to sell their shares directly at the initial offer date 
can be regarded as such. Arguably, the introduction of Rule 144 as artificial minimum 
holding period leads to an increase of the stock’s supply after the 90th trading day as the 
individuals that had been restricted until that day start offloading their holdings. 
Understandably, this sudden surge in supply affects the stock price in a negative manner. 
This research is an attempt to forecast the stock’s excess return over the S&P500 index over 
the time period of one day after the stock’s initial offering and the theoretical drop in value 
caused by the offloading of stocks by investors.   
  




What factors determine the after-market returns of IPOs? The main goal of this research is to 
attempt to design a model that by use of a regression predicts the post debut excess return of 
IPOs after 89 trading days. The model should provide a holistic approach by combining 
variables from previous research, and by using a more recent dataset than used before. The 
model will be in the form of a regression: 
𝐸𝑥𝑐𝑒𝑠𝑠 𝑟𝑒𝑡𝑢𝑟𝑛𝑡𝐼𝑃𝑂+90 = 𝛼 + 𝛽1(𝐴𝑔𝑒) + ⋯ +  𝛽6(𝑡𝑒𝑐ℎ 𝑑𝑢𝑚𝑚𝑦)  
Where 𝑡𝐼𝑃𝑂+90  stands for the IPO date plus 90 trading days. 
The first and foremost question to be answered is whether the excess returns over the 
90-day holding period are actually larger than the returns of longer holding period, in which 
investors have started the disposal of their holdings. Since lock-up periods typically range 
from 90 to 180 days, with outliers lasting as long as three years (Mohan & Chen, 2000), I 
expect to see at least a significant difference in the average excess return between the 90-day 
and 100-day holding period as investors start offloading holdings directly at the elimination 
of the period of restricted trade. 
Second, I research the influence of the company’s age-at-IPO on aftermarket 
performance as researched by Clark (2002). Clark suggests that the company’s age-at-IPO 
and aftermarket performance are negatively correlated. In his research Clark refers to a model 
from Jovanovic and Rousseau (2001)0 which views the duration of the pre-IPO waiting phase 
as the result of a tradeoff between firm learning and the opportunity cost related with delay 
to market. Prior to a firm’s IPO, the firm’s management refines the strategy and ideas while 
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early investors and creditors assess the firm’s potential, risks and optimal deployment of 
capital. This learning process is key since their capital investment is irreversible and the 
leaning process reduces the possibility of a capital mistake. However, the same learning 
process delays the realization of revenues for the firm, creating an opportunity cost that varies 
in size depending on the quality of the idea. Ceteris Paribus, the better the firm’s idea, product 
of business model, the greater the opportunity cost of delay and the younger the firm is at 
IPO.  
Third, I research whether accounting-based measures can forecast the aftermarket 
performance over the holding period of 89 days. Where this research will model the 
performance of stock returns, Platt (1995) uses accounting-based measures to estimate the 
probability of failure of the ith company. Platt initially defined a list of 31 ratios that consisted 
primarily from combinations of balance sheet items1. However, since most of the ratio’s 
proved ineffective for the estimation of failure, and under the efficient market hypothesis the 
risk of failure is almost instantly incorporated in pricing decisions, only the following subset 
of the ratios are tested here: The ratio of interest expense over cash, long-term debt over cash 
flow from operations, and the ratio of long-term debt over cash flow times the inverse of the 
prime rate, which is the interest rate typically charged by lenders to their triple-A customers. 
The ratio of interest expense to cash should indicate the organization’s ability to repay their 
debt. Since interest is paid with available liquid resources, a higher ratio indicates that the 
organization would have more trouble repaying the debt than organizations with lower ratios. 
The ratio of long-term debt / cash flow has an implication that is very similar to the ratio of 
                                                          
1 A list of variables can be found in the appendix  
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interest expenses over cash; a higher ratio implies a higher debt burden, higher risk of failure 
and lower performance. By including the prime rate I can research whether the magnitude of 
the prime rate has an influence on the performance of an IPO. The rationale behind this is 
that with high prime interest rates large levels of debt should have a negative effect on the 
organization’s performance. In contrast, when prime interest levels are low, organizations 
that have taken on debt as a cheap source of financing should have better performance levels 
than organizations that failed to take on the cheap debt. In addition to the subset of ratios 
taken from Platt (1995), I add the natural logarithm of R&D expenses to the list of tested 
variables. I expect a positive relationship between R&D expenses and performance as 
intuitively, increased R&D expenses should lead to increasingly promising products and 
business models.  The final accounting-based variable is taken from Loughran & Ritter 
(2004) who argue that the amount of assets on the firm’s balance sheet limits the percentage 
of first-day returns as it reduces the amount of underpricing as the IPO is considered less 
risky.   
Fourth, I examine the influence of the amount of time between the announcement of 
the IPO and the IPO date on aftermarket performance as researched by Plotnicki & Szyszka 
(2014). Under bullish market conditions, managers will tend to minimize the time necessary 
to go public in order to take advantage of high valuations as quickly as possible. In contrast, 
when the market cools down in the period between IPO-announcement and IPO-date, the 
organization’s managers will try to delay the actual IPO until the good market conditions 
return.   
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Fifth and finally, I research the relationship between first-day returns and the return 
over a holding period ranging from the second trading day until the ninetieth trading day as 
described by Krigman, Shaw & Womack (1999) who find that IPOs that incurred losses 
during the first day of trading, and extra-hot IPOs will underperform compared to IPOs that 
showed slightly positive profits during the first day of trading. 
 
LITERATURE REVIEW 
Why modelling the performance of IPOs is different from modelling the performance 
of other corporate organizations.  
Platt (1995) argues that many of the differences between modelling corporate versus 
IPO survival arise from the reasons why privately held companies go public. The reasons to 
go public include raising capital and the opportunity for entrepreneurs and investors to cash 
out of their investment. Demers & Joos (2007): In terms of efficient pricing and risk 
assessment IPO firms are different by character from firms that have a public trading history; 
there is a lack of information about IPO firms, and therefore there is greater uncertainty 
associated with their valuation. Extensive research has been performed on the relationships 
between specific variables and the performance of IPOs. These researches include –but are 
not limited to- the relationships between performance and balance sheet items, firm specific 
characteristics during and before the IPO such as the company’s age, characteristics of the 
offer process and firm specific characteristics after the IPO. However, most of these 
researches seem to focus on their respective area and therefore the academic literature lacks 
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a recent holistic take that implements the areas described above in one model. The following 
section reviews some of the previous researches.  
A large extent of literature on IPO performance focuses on the initial stages of the 
IPO and in particularly on underpricing. Underpricing is the pricing of the IPO under its 
market value which happens for a number of reasons. Underpricing most often occurs 
because of price uncertainties or the uncertainties about the volatility of the stock price. In 
addition, since IPO issuers and underwriter tend to have more information about the stock 
than the rest of the market, a company may decide to underwrite its stock as it is a signal of 
good intentions. Since supply and demand will eventually drive the stock price upwards 
towards its real value, IPO returns on the first day of trading are in a way artificially boosted 
which explains why it is important to include literature on the reasons for IPO underpricing.  
Lowry and Shu (2002) examine the implications of litigation risk on IPO 
underpricing. They argue that there are three reasons that partly explain underpricing: 
information asymmetry, litigation risk and signaling. According to them, litigation risk has 
received relatively little attention in empirical research. They argue that firms with higher 
litigation risk [e.g. the risk of legal action being taken as a result of the firm’s (in-)actions, 
products or services] are using underpricing as a defense mechanism against losses caused 
by lawsuits. This argument follows from the hypothesis that underpricing reduces expected 
litigation cost. Where a firm’s first weapon against falling subject to litigation cost is to 
perform thorough due diligence, a second of attempting to lower the probability of being 
sued is by minimizing the potential (monetary) damages as it is not possible to foresee every 
possible event. In their paper, Lowry and Shu describe how section 11 of the Securities Act 
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of 1933 provides investors with a standardized manner of calculating potential financial gains 
based on the difference between the offer price and either the price of the security at the time 
of the lawsuit or the security’s sale price. By underwriting more heavily, the firm reduces the 
spread between the offer- and trading price and thereby reduces potential damages such as 
settlement cost, which in turn reduces the plaintiffs’ incentives to sue substantially. For that 
reason, Lowry and Shu find that firms with higher litigation risk tend to turn to underpricing 
their IPOs more.  
Loughran and Ritter (2004) research why the degree of IPO underpricing –and 
therefore performance on the first day of trading- has fluctuated so much during specific 
intervals of time between the 1980s and 2003. They note that before jumping to 65% during 
the internet bubble years of 1999-200, the average first day return doubled from 7% during 
the 1980s to 15% between 1990 and 1998. Much of the higher underpricing during the bubble 
period is attributed to a changing issuer objective function under which issuing firms became 
more willing to accept underpricing – holding constant the levels of managerial ownership 
and other characteristics. Other reasons for the changing levels of underpricing include a 
changing risk composition, and a realignment of incentives. More importantly for the 
research at hand however, is the forecast of the first-day return of an IPO that Loughran & 
Ritter estimate by performing multiple regressions with underpricing as the dependent 
variable. The results vary over time. For example, during the period of 1990-1998, the 
coefficient of ln(assets) was much higher at -1.71 (but also more significant at a t-statistic of 
-4.65) than in the period 1999-2000, where the coefficient surged to -5.89 (but slightly less 
significant with a t-statistic of  -2.84).  
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Platt (1995) analyzes prospectus data of IPOs to develop a model that predicts an 
IPO’s survival after the first three years of issuance. Platt defines a list of 32 bankrupt IPO 
companies, and 76 survivor IPO companies and gathers data from their respective UPO 
prospectuses.  Platt finds that only 3 out of the original 31 tested ratios - “Interest/Cash”, 
“Inventory/Cash flow”, and “Long-term debt/Cash flow” are significant and therefore useful 
to predict the IPOs survival. Furthermore, he finds that elevated ratios of Interest/Cash, 
Inventory/Cash flow, and Long-term debt/Cash flow, all have a negative effect on the IPOs 
probability of survival which seems rational. One ratio that was not statistically significant 
but is particularly interesting because of the rationale behind it; the Long-term debt /Cash 
flow*(1/Prime rate). With large levels of debt at high prime interest rates should have a 
negative effect on the organization’s performance. In contrast, when prime interest levels are 
low, organizations that have taken the opportunity to load onto cheap debt should perform 
better than organizations that have failed to do so. It should be noted that Platt’s research 
only contains a total sample of 108 IPOs. The rather small sample in combination with fact 
that many IPOs are “packaged” to sell could be the reason that only so little ratios had a 
significant impact on the estimation. 
Demers & Joos (2007) offer the most holistic take on modeling factors associated 
with historical IPO failures. Their research includes “financial accounting information as 
well as variables related to the role of information of intermediaries and other IPO deal-
related characteristics”. They find that there is a difference in significance of accounting 
variables to forecast IPO failures of high-tech- & non-tech IPO firms. They argue that the 
difference comes from the fact that high-tech companies –in contrast to non-tech companies- 
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rely more on intangible assets, record accounting losses due to large research and 
development expenses more regularly and are very often largely equity-financed. Especially 
relevant for the research at hand to the 90-day returns, is that Demers & Joos suggest that 
IPO failure can be well estimated by a model that predominantly consists out of accounting 
variables and that their forecasts for IPO failure are negatively associated with one-year post-
IPO abnormal returns. In contrast to the dataset of Platt (1995), the dataset is quite extensive, 
consisting out of 3973 new issues for the period January 1980 – December 2000. To 
determine whether a company belongs to the high-tech or non-tech sector, Demers & Joos 
use the ratio of R&D expenses over sales. Companies with ratio’s larger than 5% are 
considered high-tech firms. A critical note however, is that sales is a very crude measure and 
rarely a direct value driver. It is difficult to distinguish a ‘tech’ firm from a ‘non-tech’ firm 
by simply looking at the ratio of R&D over sales. Even categorizing firms by using SIC codes 
as performed by Loughran & Ritter (2004) may not always lead to the right classification. 
For example, car manufacturer TESLA (Bloomberg ticker: TSLA:US) who has put 
substantial effort in research and development to design and market one of the first mass-
produced electronic cars was allocated the SIC code 3711 (Motor Vehicles and Passenger 
Car Bodies) by NASDAQ and is at the same time considered a tech company merely because 
of its inclusion into the NASDAQ. In contrast, BMW (Bloomberg ticker: BMW:IM) who 
also considers technology (such its ‘Efficient Dynamics’ technology or its EV-branch ‘i') as 
a selling point would be merely classified as a car manufacturer.  To avoid the problem of a 
firm being ‘up for judgment’ as to define it as a tech-company or not, the fact whether the 
stock was (formerly) included in the NASDAQ will toggle the firm’s status.  
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Clark (2002) researches the relationship between the firm’s age-at-IPO and long-run 
aftermarket performance. Clark suggests that a useful model for understanding why some 
firms IPO at such young ages is provided by Jovanovic and Rousseau (2001). Jovanovic and 
Rousseau view the age of the firm at IPO as result of a tradeoff between learning and 
opportunity cost. Essentially, the management of the firm works on refining the firm’s 
strategy and products before the firm is ready for its IPO. At the same time, investors and 
creditors build their assessment of the firm’s risks, potential and optimal capital structure. 
According to Jovanovic and Rousseau, this pre-IPO learning process is of utmost importance 
for both the firm’s managers as well as the investors and creditors as it reduces the possibility 
of a capital mistake. On the other hand, the pre-IPO learning process creates an opportunity 
cost for the firm as it delays the realization of revenues for the firm. The better the idea, the 
higher the opportunity cost, and the earlier the firm’s IPO. Consistent to prior research on the 
matter, Clark finds overall negative abnormal returns for the whole sample of IPOs during 
the period of 1991 to 1997. Just like Demers & Joos (2007), Clark observes that the 
relationship is different for technology and non-technology firms. Where the relationship 
between age and returns is slightly positive for non-technology firms, firms that were very 
young at IPO outperformed firms that were older, particularly during the 1995 – 1997 period. 
Finally, examining the age at IPO of firms that were previously delisted revealed that younger 
firms, and young high-tech firms in specific, were more like to suffer from financial difficulty 
large enough the be delisted.  
The relationship between the length of the cooling-off period and aftermarket 
performance is laid out by Plotnicki & Szyszka (2014). They argue that the stock return three 
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days post the market debut is higher for firms with faster IPO processes and that the increased 
performance can be explained by the disposition effect. In order to understand the influence 
of the disposition effect on post debut performance, Plotnicki & Szyszka first explain the 
underlying reasoning why some firms have shorter IPO processes than others. According to 
them, managers have utility functions that are similar to the utility functions as described by 
Kahneman & Tversky’s prospect theory (1979). The prospect theory describes the investor’s 
utility curve during times of profits and losses. When investors hold shares with current 
market prices higher than the purchasing price, investors will display risk aversive behavior 
by closing their position in order to lock in a sure profit. Alternatively, when the investor 
holds stocks with share prices that are currently below the purchasing price, investors become 
more risk loving and postpone the realization of losses. Linking the prospect theory to IPOs, 
Plotnicki & Szyszka argue that managers who are considering an IPO derive an initial 
valuation of their company based on multiples of publicly traded competitors. When bullish 
market circumstances post the manager’s initial valuation cause these multiples to improve, 
managers consider the increase in value as a gain. As the manager’s utility functions coincide 
with the investors’ utility functions under the prospect theory, managers have a concave 
utility function during bullish market circumstances and have a convex utility function in 
bearish markets. For that reason, managers will typically speed up the process of going public 
in order to capitalize on the higher potential value and will tend to delay the IPO to wait for 
the initial market conditions to return.  To link the aftermarket performance to the duration 
of the IPO process, Plotnicki & Szyszka studied the disposition effect among corporate 
managers. The disposition effect is the tendency for investors to sell winning stocks too soon 
and to hold on to losing stocks too long. Where the disposition effect is usually observed 
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among investors, Plotnicki & Szyszka argue that the disposition effect is also observed 
among corporate managers and that the disposition effect influences the stock’s returns in 
the short run of three days post IPO. When managers actively shorten the IPO process in 
bullish periods, the stock is priced according to the value of the firm around the debut date. 
If this date is premature, the bullish market conditions drive the market value of the firm 
further beyond its price at debut. Alternatively, when multiples wane under bearish post 
announcement circumstances, managers tend to either cancel the IPO altogether or delay 
until the market returns to a state that is more favorable. When managers choose to continue 
with the process spite of the bearish market conditions, managers try to maximize the offer 
price by reducing the discount that is required to attract investors. The lower discount 
translates in lower post IPO returns.  
Finally, Krigman, Shaw & Womack (1999) examine pricing errors by underwriters. 
They show that first-day ‘winners’ continue to be ‘winners’ over the first year and that stocks 
that lost a substantial amount during their debut continue to perform poorly over the year. 
The worst performers however, are what Krigman, Shaw & Womack call extra-hot IPOs 
which are IPOs with ‘raw’ first day returns larger than 60%. Krigman, Shaw & Womack find 
that by labelling IPOs according to their ‘raw’ first day returns, it is possible to give an 









The backbone of this research is formed by a dataset built by lead of Jay R. Ritter and 
should be credited as the Field-Ritter dataset of company founding dates, as used in Laura C. 
Field and Jonathan Karpoff "Takeover Defenses of IPO Firms" in the October 2002 Journal 
of Finance Vol. 57. No. 5, pp. 1857-1889, and in Tim Loughran and Jay R. Ritter, "Why Has 
IPO Underpricing Changed Over Time?" in the Autumn 2004 Financial Management Vol. 
33, No. 3, pp. 5-37. The dataset contains company names and tickers, and founding dates for 
9.902 firms that went public in the U.S. during 1975 – 2014. (Ritter, 2014) 
As the vast majority of research only comprises solely out of stock traded on the 
NASDAQ, I chose this specific dataset as it contains firms that are trading on the NASDAQ 
as well as the NYSE, allowing for a more holistic market research. In addition, CRSP tickers 
were already provided, making it easy to determine the appropriate tickers used by 
Bloomberg.   
Firms of which the “Issuer” field obtained from Bloomberg’s data terminal are not 
equal or very similar to the company name provided by Ritter are dropped. Stock prices 
ranging from the closing of the first day of trading and 100 trading days thereafter have been 
used to determine the shareholder’s return. To account for dividend payment and stock splits, 
the stock prices have been obtained by the use of Bloomberg’s “PX_last” function that 
returns the adjusted closing price of stocks. As all firms where traded on American stock 
exchanges, the excess returns of the firms have been determined by deducting the return on 
holding the S&P500 index over the same time period. Firms which traded less than 100 
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trading days are dropped. Financial data is gathered from the respective firm’s balance sheet 
and income statements provided by the use of a Bloomberg terminal. Even though the 
availability is lower, the data that is present is standardized which allows for better 
comparisons. A substantial amount of research such as Straetmans & Chaudhry (2013) 
emphasizes the stylized effect that financial returns are not normally distributed. Instead of 
assuming that the returns are not normally distributed, I perform a Shapiro – Wilk test in 
order to check whether the distribution is in fact non-normal.  
 
Figure 1: Tests whether the excess returns follow a normal distribution 
 
 
The outcome of the test leaves no doubt. With a large samples and a significance of 0.000, 
the null hypotheses of normality are rejected. 
Methodology 
As I am attempting to provide a more holistic approach to determine the return over 
the 90 day period, the following section describes how I will mimic the methodology of 
researches performed in different areas. To determine which determinants actually have 
predicting power of performance using the underlying assumptions and data set, I will first 
carry out parts of the researches on their own. After observing which findings seem 
statistically relevant for the dataset at hand, I will incorporate these findings in a ‘holistic 
regression’ that attempts to forecast the future performance of the IPO. 
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The influence of the company’s age-at-IPO on aftermarket performance 
As stated before, Clark (2002) suggests that managers make a trade-off between 
benefitting of firm learning and the opportunity cost related with delaying an IPO. Firms with 
better ideas, products or business models will tend to minimize the opportunity cost of 
delaying the IPO and will go public at younger ages. Under the assumption that the market 
is efficient, better business ideas, products and business models are generally associated with 
promising future returns. For that reason Clark expects to find an overall negative 
relationship between a company’s age at IPO and abnormal returns. His study indeed finds 
overall a negative relationship between the company’s age at IPO and abnormal returns over 
a holding period of three years. Just like Jovanovic and Rousseau (2001), Clark recognizes 
the importance of making a distinction between tech- and non-tech firms. Both researches 
find that technology firms publicly offered at significantly younger ages. Therefore, instead 
of dedicating an entire research question to this this matter, the dataset used in this research 
is split by using a dummy variable that takes the value “1” when the stock is traded on the 
actual NASDAQ or a NASDAQ related exchange such as the AMEX.  
To dig deeper than just the mean ages at IPO, I use a correlation matrix to determine 
the relationship between “Age at IPO” and the returns. As there is evidence that excess 
returns does not follow a normal distribution, the correlations are determined by using the 
non-parametric counterpart of Pearson correlation: Spearman’s rank correlation. As the 
dataset used by Clark consists of IPOs between 1991 and 1997 and the data used in this 
research consists out of IPOs that occurred between March 1986 and January 2014, the 
relationship between age at IPO and return may be distorted by the inclusion of IPOs that 
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have occurred later than 1997 or since the start of the financial crisis. This nourishes the need 
to control for these possibly distorting IPOs and therefore the correlation matrix is run again. 
Once to exclude IPOs that occurred after 2008, and another time to exclude IPOs after 1997. 
I will run extra regressions in order to compare the differences. 
 
The influence of accounting-based measures on aftermarket performance 
The following section describes the influence of a set of accounting-based measures 
on aftermarket performance. These measures are the ratio interest expense over cash, the 
ratio of long term debt over cash flow from operations, the ratio of long term debt over cash 
flow from operations times the inverse of the prime rate, the logarithm of R&D expenses, 
and the logarithm of total assets. These variables were taken from Platt (1995) except for the 
logarithm of assets - taken from Loughran & Ritter (2004) – and the logarithm of R&D 
expenses.  
For the ratio interest rate expense / cash, and the long term debt over cash flow, I expect to 
find the similar results as Platt (1995), who finds that elevated ratios of Interest/Cash, 
Inventory/Cash flow, and Long-term debt/Cash flow, all have a negative effect on the IPOs 
probability of survival. I assume that the probability of survival reflected by the individual 
firm’s ratios is almost immediately incorporated in the stock price through supply and 
demand. To control for the differences between tech- and non-tech firms, I perform a Kruskal 
Wallis test in order to check whether the means are different for the two types or firms.  
 




The influence of the length of the cooling-off period on aftermarket performance  
Before testing whether the disposition effect also affects returns 90 days post IPO, I will first 
test whether the state of the market prior to the announcement and pricing dates has an 
influence on the duration of the IPO process for firms in this particular dataset. For that 
purpose, the return on the S&P500 index over 30, 60, and 90 trading days before the 
announcement date and initial offering date are used to proxy the state of the market and 
market sentiment for IPOs. Since the market rate 90 days prior to the announcement date 
shows the largest absolute coefficient (under equal significance levels), I have set up a 
regression model that takes the following form: 
𝐶𝑖 = 𝛼𝑅𝑠𝑝90𝑖 + 𝜀𝑖 
Where 𝐶𝑖 is the length of the cooling-off period in days for the i-th IPO case, 𝑅𝑠𝑝90𝑖 is the 
return of the S&P500 index over the 90 days prior to the announcement date measured in 
basis points, and 𝜀𝑖 is the error-term.   
To determine the impact of the disposition effect on the return of the stock after 90 trading 
days, I run another regression of the following form:  
𝑅90𝑖 = (𝐶𝑖) + 𝜀𝑖 
Where 𝑅90𝑖 is the return over the 90 day holding period, and 𝐶𝑖 remains the length of the 
cooling-off period in days. To further prove the existence of the disposition effect, I include 
the dummy variable “Fast_IPO” which takes the value 1 if the length of the cooling-off 
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process was lower than the median of 78. A following Wilcoxon rank sum test should then 
determine whether the return for firms with shorter IPO processes indeed have higher returns. 
Will labelling IPOs according to their first day returns give an indication of future 
performance? 
As Krigman, Shaw & Womack (1999) focus on the information contained in the returns of 
the first day of trading, they argue that there exists a relationship between the raw return on 
the first day of trading and long-term performance of that stock for the coming year. By what 
they call “partitioning” of the IPOs by the first-day return, it is possible to form an indication 
of future performance. The histogram in Panel B was taken from Krigman, Shaw & Womack 
(1999) and gives an indication of the IPOs future performance, based on the IPOs return on 
the first day of trading. First I will determine the raw return of the IPO on the first day of 
trading. After that, as Krigman, Shaw & Womack argue that “winner will be winners” I can 
recreate the image below using the mean returns over the buy-and-hold period of the next 89 
days starting from the day after the stock’s debut. By trying out several sets of labels, I can 
constuct a non-linear regression to forecast the mean return over the holding period.   
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RESULTS AND DISCUSSION 
 
The influence of the company’s age-at-IPO on aftermarket performance 
 
Table 2: Descriptive Statistics [all firms] 
 
 
Table 3: Descriptive Statistics [Tech Dummy] 
 
 
The descriptive statistics in tables 1 and 2 show that the mean age in years for non-tech 
organizations is almost ten years higher than the mean age at IPO for tech organizations. This 
would support the idea that managers act rational and minimize the opportunity cost of 
remaining privately owned as suggested by Clark (2002). This also gives rise to the idea that 
the ideas from tech firms are more pressing by nature. From the correlation matrix in table 4 
it can be observed that for the entire dataset, the correlation between the excess returns and 
age at IPO is slightly positive and significant at a five percent confidence level. This also 
coincides with Clark’s finding. However, when the dataset is divided between tech- and non-
tech firms like in table 5, I do not find the same result as Clark. Where the correlation 
coefficient of non-tech firms coincide with the positive correlation coefficient found by 
Clark, the relationship between age at IPO and the excess returns for non-tech firms is the 
exact opposite. Instead of finding a negative coefficient for tech-firms, the correlation 
coefficient for tech-firms in this research is positive but insignificant at a 5 percent 
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confidence level. Therefore, the only conclusion that can be drawn is that the data only shows 
a rather small correlation between a firm’s age at IPO and its return.  
 
Table 4: Correlation matrix for Excess returns & Age at IPO. 
 
 
Table 5: Correlation matrix for Excess returns & Age at IPO,  
dividing between tech- & non-tech firms. 
 
There are three possible reasons that may explain why the observed correlation coefficients 
above differ from the coefficients as observed in Clark (2002). First is the difference in the 
holding period; where Clark’s findings are based on a holding period of 36 months, the excess 
returns in this research are calculated on a holding period of 90 days. In addition, Clark only 
lists the adjusted closing price at end of the first month of trading and calculates the excess 
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returns over the CRSP value weighted stock index while the excess returns in this study are 
based on the returns of the S&P500 index. As Clark tests the market’s efficiency to capitalize 
on promising returns from firms that went public at a young age, the contradicting 
coefficients suggest that the market needs more than 90 trading days to incorporate these 
promising returns. A third possible reason for the contradicting findings lies in the time 
period in which the firms went public. 
 




Table 7: Correlation matrix Excess returns & Age at IPO for firms that publicly offered in 
the year 2008 or later. 
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As can be observed from figures 5, 6 and 7, I find no reason to assume that the correlations 
were different (or even more statistically significant) for public offerings in other periods of 
time.  As the distinction between tech and non-tech firms distorts the relationship, I regress 
the Age at IPO against the excess return after 90 trading days. Figure 7 shows the results of 
the regression. I find that the model is highly insignificant from the correlation matrices, and 
therefore this model does not explain any of the change in the return. This finding is robust 
with the inclusion of a tech dummy, nor transforming the variable Age at IPO to the natural 
logarithm ln(1+Age) of a tech dummy improves the results. 
 
 
Table 8: Regression of Age at IPO against the excess returns 
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The influence of accounting-based measures on aftermarket performance 
The following section describes the results of the test of normality, the Kruskal Wallis test to 
test for differences between the ratios of tech- and non-tech firms, correlation coefficients 
between the ratios and Excess returns after 90 days, and finally the regression. Figure 9 shows 
the descriptive statistics of the excess returns and the ratios. What is striking is the large 
difference between the groups’ average means of LTD / CF operations, and ln(Assets). Less 
striking but still counterintuitive is the severe difference between means of tech- and non-
tech firms, or the fact that the mean of expenses on research and development expressed by 
ln(R&D) is higher for non-tech firms than for tech firms. As it might be valuable to 
understand whether the groups actually have different means I need to determine whether the 
data follows the normal distribution. For that reason I include a Shapiro Wilk test of 
normality in shows that only the variable ln(1+Assets) follows a normal distribution. 
However, since combined set of ln(1+Assets) does not follow the normal distribution, this 
finding is ignored and it is assumed that all variables follow a non-normal distribution as is  
 
Table 9: Descriptive statistics 
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the stylized case with financial data. To shed some more light on the actual differences 
between the groups, I run a Kruskal Wallis test. As the null-hypothesis of the Kruskal Wallis 
implies that there are no differences between the group’s means, I can conclude that there is 
a statistically significant difference between the groups’ mean Excess return, and the natural 
logarithm of R&D expenses. Because of the statistically significant difference between the 
means, it pays off to check whether the different characteristics of tech- and non-tech firms 
also influence the correlations. 
 
 
Table 10: Kruskal Wallis test for normality 
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Table 11: Correlation matrix excess return & ratios 




Table 12: Correlation matrix excess return & ratios 
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As I conclude from table 11, splitting the dataset into two groups in an attempt to control for 
differences in between the groups’ means does not help in achieving more statistically 
significant variables of the expected sign. For that reason, I return to an analysis of the 
correlation coefficients that are shown in table 12 as a larger dataset might return more 
significant values. Where Platt (1995)  finds a significant and positive relationship for the 
ratios of interest rate over cash, and long-term debt over cash flow from operations, I find no 
significant relationship. However, the variables ln(Assets) and long-term debt in combination 
with the prime rate, show a significant relationship with the correct sign.  The implication of 
the positive correlation between the excess returns and the ratio of long-term debt over cash 
flow in combination with the inverse of the prime interest rate might need some clarification. 
The inclusion of the inverse prime rate, allows for testing the influence of the prime rate on 
the implications of debt. When prime rate levels are above eleven percent, Platt observes that 
an increasing long-term debt over cash flow ratio increases the probability of failure of the 
ith company.  For prime interest rate levels lower than eleven percent, the effects are reversed.    
“Another way to view this is that as a result of the interdependency between indebtedness 
and cash flow, there is a window of opportunity for IPOs to acquire low-cost debt. Those 
who miss the window may end up capital short and more likely to fail.” (Platt, 1995). 
Unfortunately, even though both variables showed a significant correlation with excess 






The influence of time between the announcement of the IPO and the initial offering 
date on aftermarket performance  
Just like Plotnicki & Szyszka (2014) I find statistically negative correlations between the 
returns for all periods prior to the announcement date and the length of the cooling-off period. 
Table 13 shows that the correlations between the market’s returns thirty and sixty days prior 
to the pricing date and the length of the cooling-off period are statistically insignificant. This 
confirms the idea that managers base their decision on the duration of the IPO process before 
the actual start of the IPO process, and that managers indeed tend to shorten the IPO process 
during bullish market conditions, and delay the IPO during bearish conditions. The 90 day 
return before pricing shows a significant negative coefficient. However, as the median of the 
cooling-off period of this dataset is 78 days, it is possible that the significant correlation is 
polluted by overlapping time periods. For that reason, I will disregard the coefficient and 
assume that only the returns prior to the announcement date have a significant correlation.  
The model in table 14 that was set up to depict the relationship between market conditions 
and the length of the cooling-off period shows a highly significant unstandardized coefficient 
of the expected sign of -0.019. The implication behind the coefficient is that for every basis 
point of increase in the return of the market measured over 90 days, the duration of the 
cooling-off period is reduced by 0.019 days. The results of the second regression in table 15 
show that market returns are negatively correlated with the length of the cooling-off period. 
As expected, the coefficient of -3.762, implies that the excess return decreases by 3.762 basis 
points per day of cooling-off period. While attempting to obtain more significant variables 
in the regression, I add the dummy ‘Fast_IPO’ which takes the value of 1 when the cooling-
off period was shorter than the median of 78. 





Table 13: Correlation matrix between the length of the cooling-off  
period and returns of the S&P500 market index. 




Table 14: Shows the statistically significant negative relationship between the cooling-off 




Table 15: Shows that the duration of the cooling-off period indeed has a significant and 
negative effect on the excess returns  
 
 





Table 16: The Wilcoxon Rank sum test shows that the mean rank of excess returns after 90 
trading days is indeed for firms with faster IPOs 
 
Until now, the only factor that shows significant explanatory power to forecast the excess 
returns over the holding period over 89 days was the duration of the cooling-off period. With 
the inclusion of the findings from Krigman, Shaw & Womack, (1999) - who argue that the 
excess returns over the holding period of one year can be determined by the returns of the 
first day of trading – I expect to include one more extra variable to the regression. 
 
Figure 1: Mean holding period return per label. 
Figure 1 shows the mean holding period return per label. In contrast to Krigman, Shaw & 
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show negative mean returns for the rest of the holding period, I find that the mean long-term 
return of the stocks that incurred a loss on the first day of trading is positive. Because 
Krigman, Shaw & Womack also argue that their findings are robust for other labelling ranges, 
I regressed the frist-day returns against the main holding period returns. It shows that the 
excess returns over 90 days are negatively correlated to the mean holding period returns. 
Figure 2 shows a scatterplot with the first raw returns plotted on the x-axis and the excess 
return over the holding period on the y-axis. Even though the fit of the line though re residuals 
is not even two percent, I will add first day raw returns to the regression as a independent 
variable. 
 
Figure 2: Negative relationship between the  
first-day returns and the mean holding period return 
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THE HOLISTIC REGRESSION 
 
In my opinion it is at the very least disappointing to find that only three variables taken from 
previous research have some explanatory capability. The variables that have shown to be 
capable of explaining the values are: the duration of the cooling-off period, the dummy 
variable ‘Fast_IPO’ and the raw returns earned on the first day of public trading. The final 
table (figure 17) in this research shows the output of a regression that was constructed using 
the stepwise method. In model 1, FAST-IPO is the only variable that was included in the 
regression. The implication of the model is rather simple as the only predictor is a dummy 
variable. In cases where a firm’s IPO process is faster than the median IPO, the firm’s mean 
return over the period one day after the public offering date until the ninetieth trading day 
will increase by 1686 percentage points. With an R Square of 0.036, the model can explain 
3.6 percent of the residuals. 
Model two has 3 percent more explanatory power. In the case of this model, in addition to 
the ‘Fast_IPO’ dummy variable, the returns over the 90 day holding period are now also 
explained by the model. It implies that an increase in the first-day raw return of one basis 
point will decrease the excess returns over the 90 day period by 0.081 basis points.  
 
𝐸𝑥𝑐𝑒𝑠𝑠 𝑟𝑒𝑡𝑢𝑟𝑛𝑡𝐼𝑃𝑂+90 
= 𝛼 + 1729 ∗ (𝑑𝑢𝑚𝑚𝑦) − 0.081 ∗ (𝐹𝑖𝑟𝑠𝑡_𝑑𝑎𝑦_𝑟𝑎𝑤_𝑟𝑒𝑡𝑢𝑟𝑛_𝐵𝑃𝑇𝑆)  
 
 





Table 17: the final regression 
 
  




This research has attempted to forecast the returns on a holding period of IPO stock. The 
holding period ranges from the 90th trading day to thee stock’s debut on the exchange which 
started. Regarding the influence of the company’s age-at-IPO on aftermarket performance, I 
found no significant relationships that could forecast the excess returns. This finding was 
robust after controlling for the type of firm and the different time periods. 
With respect to the influence of accounting based measures on aftermarket performance, even 
though the output correlation matrices suggested small but significant relationships between 
the accounting measures and the excess return, not one of the variables shows explanatory 
power. As opposed to Platt (1995) who finds no relationship between the prime rate and the 
ratio of cash flow from operations over long-term debt, I find that the prime rate has a positive 
correlation with the cash flow of from operations over long-term debt.  
After having confirmed the influence of the return on the S&P500 index on the duration of 
the IPO process, I found a positive relationship between the speed of the IPO and post-IPO 
performance. The dummy variable “Fast_IPO” is also included in the final regression. 
Finally, by following the findings of Krigman, Shaw & Womack (1999), I found that 
labelling first-day IPO returns are a reasonably accurate way to predict the IPOs future 
performance over the holding period of 89 days when the relationship follows a linear 
relationship. 
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Financial and Economic Variables Analyzed and Ratios Tested 
Variables Abbreviation   Ratios tested 
            
Balance Sheet Items:           
Cash Plus Marketable Securities CASH   INT/CASH   LTD/CASH 
Inventories  INV   INV/CF   INV/CASH 
Current Assets  CA   LTD/CF   LTD + INV/CF 
Current Liabilities  CL   (LTD/CF)*(1/PR)   INV/CA 
Total Assets TA   CA/TA   CA/LTD 
Net Plant NP   LTD/OY   INT/OY 
Long-term Debt LTD   %GNP   PR 
Common Equity CE   CF*(1+%GNP)   
INT/CASH * 
(1/PR) 
            
Income Statement Items:     DA/CASH   NP/CASH 
Operating income OY   INV + CASH/CF   INV/LTD 
Depreciation and Amortization DA   LTD/INT   LTD/CE 
Interest Expense INT   CA/CL   CA - INV/CL 
Cash Flow CF   CA/CE   CA/OY 
      DA/OY   OY/%GNP 
Economic Factors:     INV/CF * (1/PR)   OY/PR 
Prime Rate (on day of IPO) PR   LTD/%GNP     
Percentage Change in GNP %GNP         
            
Source: Platt (1995) Table 1           
Ratios tested in holistic model indicated in blue         
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